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Summary In this paper a quantitative method for hazard and risk analysis is discussed. The method was developed and 
introduced for the allocation of safety requirements to the functions of a railway signaling remote control system. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In case of safety critical railway systems a haz-
ard and risk analysis (HRA) must be performed in 
order to establish the safety requirements for the 
system. Based on the analysis, to each safety critical 
function of the system (those functions, the fault of 
which can lead to hazard) the safety integrity re-
quirement, concerning random and systematic faults 
can be established [1], [2]. 
The analysis and the definition of safety re-
quirements can vary upon different risk parameters 
used, and so the method can be quantitative, qualita-
tive or semi-quantitative [3], [4]. 
In this paper a quantitative method will be in-
troduced, which was developed and applied for the 
risk analysis of a railway signaling remote control 
system [5]. 
 
2. MAIN STEPS OF THE ANALYSIS 
 
In the preparation phase of the analysis the fol-
lowing steps must be performed: 
- definition of the interfaces of the system; 
- enlist all potentially hazardous outputs of the 
system (commands and indications); 
- definition of possible failure modes for the 
outputs (these are object and function mistake 
and unintended command output in case of 
commands, and faulty indication in case of indi-
cations); 
- the possible consequence (severity of damages) 
of the hazards must be identified; in this sense 
those damage categories were used, that are 
suggested by the standard EN 50126 [1]. 
 
Risk of a hazard is determined not only by the 
severity of the damage that it can cause, but also by 
the occurrence frequency or probability of the haz-
ard. The calculated risks have to be classified into 
risk classes, and for each risk class the necessary 
integrity requirements must be defined. This latter 
can be achieved e.g. by ordering tolerable hazard 
rates (THR) for each risk class. 
According to the proposed method, THR values 
are directly ordered to the damage categories, inde-
pendently from the frequency or probability of the 
hazard, as the first step (Tab. 1). More serious haz-
ards are so allowed to occur less frequently, thus the 
tolerable risk level of different hazardous functions 
can be kept at the same level [6]. 
Of course, other values of THR in the ordering 
or any other definition of THR can be adopted; this 
will not influence the proposed hazard and risk 
analysis procedure as a whole. 
 
Tab. 1. Ordering of THR values to damage categories 
Consequence 
(damage)  
THR 
[h-1] 
catastrophic → 10-9 
critical → 10-8 
minor → 10-7 
irrelevant → 10-6 
 
From the THR value the tolerable hazard prob-
ability of the system can be calculated for the end of 
the projected life time of the equipment T, according 
to (1). 
 
TTHR
h e)T(p ⋅−−= 1  (1) 
 
In most of the cases a hazard, caused by a faulty 
function of the examined system will not lead di-
rectly to an accident, only if certain events occur 
contemporarily or a given situation exists simultane-
ously. The probability of the existence of these traf-
fic or operational situations can be determined statis-
tically, and can be handled as constant probabilities 
[6]. In course of the analysis, to all hazards, the 
necessary contemporary events and situations must 
be identified; furthermore their probability has to be 
calculated. Finally, the resulting probability pc has to 
be calculated, if more than one contemporary event 
is necessary to evolve an accident. In a simple case 
the resulting probability can be calculated as a pro-
duction of single probabilities; otherwise, in a more 
complicated combination of the contemporary 
events fault tree analysis can be used to calculate the 
resulting probability. The probability of an accident 
at the end of the projected life time of the investi-
gated equipment can be calculated according to (2). 
 
 )T(pp)T(p hc ⋅=1  (2) 
 
Since the reduction factor pc of the contempo-
rary events were taken into account, the tolerable 
hazard probability pb(T) can be bigger by the factor 
1/pc, than without reduction factors as shown in (3) 
(Fig. 1, Fig. 2). 
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This latter case means, that the reduction factors 
alone fulfil the required THR value, thus it is not 
needed to prescribe any requirement against the 
examined system (the required safety is fulfilled 
even if the equipment is always faulty). 
 
Tolerable hazard 
probability
Probability of 
contemporary 
events
Tolerable failure 
probability of the 
equipment
(…)
 
Fig. 1. Calculation of tolerable failure probability 
 
 
Fig. 2. Failure probabilities 
 
If pb(T)1, the tolerable failure rate of the 
equipment can be calculated from the tolerable fail-
ure probability of the equipment, as shown by (4). 
 
T
TpbTHR b ))(1ln( −−=  (4) 
The value bTHR represents the required integ-
rity against random hardware faults, regarding the 
examined function and failure mode. Integrity re-
quirements against systematic and software faults 
can be determined by using Safety Integrity Levels 
(SIL), based on the bTHR value.  
 
Tab. 2. Ordering of SIL to bTHR values 
bTHR 
per function and hour 
Safety Integrity 
Level (SIL) 
10-9  bTHR < 10-8 4 
10-8  bTHR < 10-7 3 
10-7  bTHR < 10-6 2 
10-6  bTHR < 10-5 1 
10-5  bTHR 0 
 
The Safety Integrity Level, which can be or-
dered to the bTHR values are shown in Tab. 2. The 
table is identical with that of the normative Annex A 
of EN 50129 [2]. 
 
3. RESULTS 
A detailed analysis for all failure modes of all 
potentially hazardous functions have to be per-
formed, according to the procedure described above. 
If a hazard of a failure mode of a function can result 
in more than one consequence, the most rigorous 
value have to be considered, which results after 
taking all, different reduction factors into account. 
Based on the results of the analysis, the remote 
control equipment have to be constructed so, that  
- the hazardous failure rate of functions may not 
exceed the defined tolerable failure rate bTHR 
of the given function (random faults); and 
- the guidelines and requirements of the standards 
EN 50128 and EN 50129 shall be fulfilled, with 
respect to the defined safety integrity level. 
As a summary it can be stated, that the proposed 
quantitative method requires higher expenditures 
than the usual qualitative ones. This is because of 
the necessity of the large amount of initial statistical 
data. However, the higher expenditures can be 
traded off by more precise results, which enables to 
put lower safety requirements against some func-
tions of the system, thus the development and the 
operation of the system can be less expensive, while 
the system does not cause more hazards, than toler-
able. 
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